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The unemployment and capacity-utilization
rates measure the labor and capital market
pressures in the nation's economy. The two
measures have much in common, and between
them provide a reasonably clear picture ofhow
much slack is present in the economy, and how
much real growth we may expect before the
economy encounters serious bottlenecks.
This article examines relative movements in
the two series throughout the postwar period.
Until 1974, unemployment and unused capacity
bore a stable relationship to one another. Since
1974, however, unemployment has been increas-
ingly higher than one would have predicted on
the basis of its relation to unused capacityl in
previous cycles. Unused capacity, however, has
behaved in therecent recessionandinthepresent
recovery just as it has in previous cycles. This
observation leads to the conclusion that unused
capacity is still a good measure ofoverall factor-
market tightness while unemployment is not.
The economy is thus likely to enter a period with
available capacity constraining output but with
the unemployment rate stillwell above 6percent.
The remaining sections document these con-
clusions. Section I points out the potential non-
comparability ofthe two series, but shows that,
until 1974, they provided similar indications of
factor-market tightness except during a few
strike- or war-affected periods. Section II dis-
cusses the normal cyclical pattern of unused
capacity and unemployment. The concluding
Section III turns to the present discrepancy-
unmatched in the postwar period-between un-
used capacity and unemployment. Basically, we
find that unused capacity in the currentrecovery
has generally matched its earlier pattern, as has
the amount of decline (though not the level) of
unemployment. Thissuggests thatunused capac-
ity is as muchas evera relevantmeasure offactor
market tightness. Further, the elements which
have produced the present very high unemploy-
ment, it will be argued, will not disappear quick-
ly. High unemployment, both absolutely and
relative to its past relation to unused capacity, is
likely to remain a feature ofthe economy for at
least three to five years.
I. Unemployment-Capacity Relationship
Over Time
Both the unemployment and unused capacity
data rest on sample surveys-the first, of the
civilian population, and the second, ofmanufac-
turers. Both are proximate measures of the
degree of tightness in the markets for the two
main factors of production. There is a strong
reason why the two measures should trackclose-
ly over time: capital is reproducible, and thus
over long periods oftime, the capital-labor ratio
can be altered substantially. For example, an
influx of labor could lower the wage rate as
compared with the return to capital. In thiscase,
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the demand for labor by employers would rise,
the demand for capital would decline, and after
an adjustment period, there would be no impor-
tant effect on the usage ofeither capital orlabor
(Chart I).
Suppose the wage rate relative to the returnof
the capital is (~) 0 with the constant-
expenditure line in Chart I showing how a
constant total cost can purchase various combi-
nations of labor and capital. The production
process itself implies a technological trade-off
between added units ofcapital and labor, whichis labelled as the "production possibility curve"
for the fixed output Yo. The point of minimum
cost ofproduction is reached where the marginal
contribution ofcapital and labor to cost are the
same: where the (~)0 line is tangent to the
possibility curve. The least costly way ofprodu-
cing the output y() is to use an amount KO of
capital and La oflabor. Now suppose the labor
supply increases, initiallydriving unemployment
up and wages down, with the cost line now at
(T) 1 . Capital is now relatively less attractive
than before, so manufacturers will tend to cut
back on investment plans and hire more labor.
Eventually we reach the new point ofminimum
cost, with all ofthe new labor absorbed (at L I)
and with less capitalin use (at KI)'The result is a
lower real wage, and a capital-labor ratio
changed from (~) ~o (~){ but with little effect
on the long-run unemployment and unused
capacity rates.
This argument applies only over substantial
periods oftime, both to allowfor enoughchange
in investment to alterthe capital-labor ratio and
to make the assumption of a flexible wage-to-
profit ratio reasonable. This type ofadjustment
will notaffect periodsas shortas a businesscycle,
for it does not pay to adjust productionmethods
in periods as shortas the typical recession. Thus










- - - - -1---
1
I L..- --.:.:: L
Lo
47
substantially in recessions, and remain high for
some time after recessions end. Historically,
however, the two measures have remained in
close alignment despite three elements which
could have changed their relationship to each
other.
First, labor force composition has changed
over time, reflecting mostly an increase infemale
participation.2 To the extent that different
groups of workers are not good substitutes for
each otherin terms ofskill, thecompositionshift
may imply an increase in the observed unem-
ployment rate associated with any given state of
aggregate demand. However, we can analyze
such compositional changes just as we did the
relationship between capital and labor.
If one group enters the labor force in large
numbers, that group's relative wage should fall,
leading employers to increase hiring in that
group. This should create some tendency for
subgroup unemployment rates to equalize over
time. We should note thatsubgroups ofthe labor
force are not reproducible in the same sense that
capital assets are, and that the labor market
contains elements which preventadequateshort-
term wage adjustment-among others, the
minimum-wage law and its relationship to high
unemployment among the young. These factors
suggest that market adjustments among labor-
force groups will be slower than between aggre-
gate laborand capital, althoughmarketpressure
should remain an important long-term force in
equalizing unemployment between groups.
The second problem is that any sample
survey-such as those used todevelop ourunem-
ployment and unused-capacity measures-is
open to some subjectivityonthepartofrespond-
ents. For instance, someone who has been laid
off but has stopped seeking work may perceive
himself as unemployed, but may not be counted
as such according to the official definition. In
similar fashion, a manufacturer facing strong
demand pressures may perceive his capacity as
increasing because he has adopted more costly
processes (like added shifts) that he would nor-
mally regard as uneconomic.
The Federal Reserve Board's capacity-
utilization series-like the Bureau of Labor
Statistics' unemployment series-must be re-
garded as an excellent example ofthe surveyart.Capacity utilization is a relatively ambiguous
concept, and thus the Board uses two independ-
ent surveys inconstructingits estimatesofmanu-
facturing capacity. One source provides data on
real investment over the cycle (the Commerce
Department's Bureau of Economic Analysis),
and the second source provides capacity-
utilization data (McGraw-Hill). The use of in-
vestment data avoids much of the subjectivity
inherent in the utilization survey. For example,
there is some tendency for manufacturers to
report plant shutdowns during recessions as
losses in capacity, when the closings are in fact
temporary. The reported loss must beconfirmed
by a reduction in investment orincreased scrap-
page before the Board will lower its capacity
estimates and adjust the utilization data.
The BLS unemployment data are based on a
monthly survey of 47,000 households, designed
to measure the overall unemployment rate to
within 0.2percent. Thesurveyincludes questions
to insure that respondents understand the exact
meaning of the very precise BLS definitions of
unemployment and labor-force participation.
Consequently, any error in the survey must arise
from a difference between the BLS intent-
measuring thelaborforce-and the respondent's
intent (aside from the pure sampling error in
using 47,000 households to represent a labor
force of nearly 100 million).
The main source oferror concerning intent is
probably the unemployment-insurance laws,
which provide that a person who has been laid
off must be looking for work (that is, must be in
the labor force) to receive unemployment bene-
fits. The law thuscreatesanincentivefor someto
say they are in the labor force when in fact they
are not actively seeking work. Recent increases
in unempl'9yment benefits, and in the length of
time benefits are paid, have probably increased
the number of people in this position. (See
companion article by Rose McElhattan.)
Finally, the capacity-usage figures apply by
definition only to manufacturers. Manufactur-
ing has declined fairly steadily relative to GNP
over the postwar generation, reflectingthe rise in
government spending and in the consumptionof
services from 34.5 percentofGNPin 1950 to 50.1
percent in 1976. This shift may distort any
relationship between unusedcapacityand unem-
ployment, because the cyclicity ofthe shrinking
portion of employment in manufacturing may
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II. Cyclical Pattern of Unemployment and
Unused Capacity
To analyze the importance ofthese considera- The re-scaling of the data makes the unused-
tions in determining movements in unemploy- capacity series intoaseries with the sameaverage
ment and unused capacity, we may compare the recession run-up of2.9 percent as the unemploy-
time series of the two (Chart 2). To make the ment rate, as well as the same 1950-76 mean of
series directly comparable, the actual unused 5.3 percent. In the chart, the average levels of
capacity series has been re-scaled with the aid of unemployment and unused capacity serve as
the information in Table 1. measures of normal factor usage, and their
average recession increases serve as measures of
the normal amount of fluctuation in the two
series. Itshould be kept in mind thattheunused-
capacity series normally increases 5 percentage
points-equal to (l3.8j2.9)-for each I-point
increase in unemployment.
The chart data indicate, first, that the two
factor-usage series told the same basic storyuntil
1974. The two series peaked together in each
recession through 1970, generally within one
quarter of each other. Further, unemployment
declined much more slowly thanunusedcapacity
in each post-war recovery (including the present
48one), with the unused-capacity measure drop-
ping well below unemployment by the third
quarter of recovery. There is no evidence ofany
shift in the observed relationship between the
factor markets until the 1974-76 recession-and-
recovery.
A second observation is that unused capacity
rises in periods ofvery tight labor markets (i.e.,
below about 4-percent unemployment). In-
creases occurred in 1955-56, and in 1966-67, at
times of quite low unemployment. Increases in
unused capacity did not occur at the recovery
lows in unemployment in 1958-59 and 1972-73
when unemployment remained well above 4
percenP This apparent anomaly is explained by
induced investment in these periods of high
demand for goods. A relatively low level of
unused capacity coupled with a flat level of
unemployment thus appears to be a reliable
measureofgreatsupplypressureintheeconomy.
A third useful observation is that a steadily
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49since the startofthe 1974-75 recession. Onlypart
of this can. be attributed to the normally more
rapid decline in unused capacity than in unem-
ployment. This point will be discussed later in
this article.
The cyclical behavior of unemployment and
unused capacity in the past five cycles (Chart 3)
also deserves analysis. First, unemployment and
unused capacity have on average declined until
the cyclicalpeaks werereached. Thus, the factor
markets have generally failed to provide a
systematic warning ofthe onset ofrecession. In
effect, there is no "incipient recession" phase of
the cycle, when income growth deceleratesto the
point of sluggish unemployment.and unused
capacity, but not to the point ofqualifying as a
recession. The unused-capacity rate provided
evidence of tight supply conditions on .two
occasions-1955 and 1965~but recession did
not follow forovertwoyearsfollowing 1955, and
for over four years following 1965.
Secondly, unused capacity tends to rise less
rapidly than unemployment in recessions, but
also tends to recover much more quickly, falling
Chart 3
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50to moderately low pre-recession levels by the
fifth to seventh quarter after the recession
trough. This suggests that unused capacity be-
haves very asymmetrically with respect to unem-
ploymentjunused capacity relationship probably
usual recession-recovery pattern in GNP is for a
sharp fall during recession (relative to its growth
trend) followed by a long recovery period of
growth above trend. But unused capacity falls in
recovery almost as fast as it rises in recession,
suggesting that early recoveryconsists for manu-
facturers of putting machines back to work
before making new hires. This pattern is under-
stan'dable; most machinery costs must be paid
whether the machine is used or not, while most
wage costs depend on the amount oflaborhired.
Thirdly, and in contrast, unemployment fol-
lows the pattern set by GNP, with a rapid rise in
recession and a prolonged period ofslow decline
thereafter. This pattern helps account for the
perception many workers have of recession as
lasting much longer than the official definition
suggests. These workers define recession as a
period ofhigh unemployment, while statisticians
define it as the preceding, much shorter, period
of negative income growth.
III. Outlook for Unused Capacity and
Unemployment
Since 1974, there has been a substantial in-
crease in the unemployment rate relative to
unused capacity. Because unused capacity has
shown no tendencyto increase overtime, we may
ask whether this increment in unemployment
will persist for any length of time.
In Section I, we argued that reproducibility of
capital helps keep the average level of unused
capacity stable over time, as manufacturers
adjust their investment demand to keep their
capital stock in line with the long-run demand
they expect for their output. A portion of any
needed adjustment can be accomplished fairly
quickly by cuttinginvestmentsharply. Thefall in
fixed investment in 1974-75 was in fact quite
sharp, and investment has remained sluggish
since, thus accounting forthe"normal"behavior
of unused capacity despite the continuing low
level of income relative to past trends.
The laborforce does not have the same kind of
self-adjusting capacity, so the severity of the
1974-75 recession has left us with substantial
unemployment two full years after the recession
trough. However, the amount of decline in
unemployment we have experienced-from a
high of 8.8 percent in 1975.2 to 7.4 percent in
I977.1-is closely in line with the decline in
earlier recessions.4 With unused capacity show-
ing normal cyclical behavior, we may expectthat
with a continuing recovery, unused capacity by
mid-1978 will reach a low level while unemploy-
ment is still in the neighborhood of61 1z percent.
There are two scenarios as to what may hap-
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pen after mid-I978. The first is a period oflong-
term adjustment of the capital-labor ratio, as
illustrated in Chart 1, and thusa return to a more
typical unemploymentjunused capacity rela-
tion. In the past, this scenario has required a shift
to an investment-led recovery in output, so the
appearance of strong investment growth would'
be a key that this scenario is being followed. The
alternative possibility would be a recession after
mid-1978, anda postponementoftheadjustment
until the succeeding recovery. Therewould be no
reduction in unemployment relative to unused
capacity.
The first scenario has been typical ofrecover-
ies with low unused capacity, as we expect in
mid-1978. We may examine the two earlier
periods when quite low levels ofunused capacity
were reached well before the trough in unemploy-
ment. These periods were in 1955 and 1965.5
Both periods were part oflong recoveries (1954-
57 and 1961-69) and the low points in unused
capacity were accompanied by substantial in-
creases in investment. In both cases, unused
capacity rose significantly (about 2 percent) in
the year following the low point and remained at
that new plateau until the cyclical peak in real
income was reached. Also in both cases, unem-
ployment continued to decline, though rather
slowly, right up to the income peaks, which were
marked by unemployment ratesbelow4percent.
Thus both periods marked long-runadjustments
in the capital-labor ratio.
In the past, then, low unused capacity in mid-recovery has not been a barriertofurtherexpan-
sionofoutputor to further reductions in unem-
ployment. Shouldthese events recur-especially
the.shift to an.investment-led recovery-the
more typical relationship of unemployment to
unused capacity could be restored for the period
after mid-1978.
It should be emphasized that this scenario is
notinevitable, because it relies onacontinuation
of the economic recovery through 1978, and
especially on greater investment growth. The
shorter two of the four most recent recoveries
(1958-60 and 1971-73) eachendedwithouta long
period oHow unused capacity, and thus without
a long period ofhigh investment. Both ended
with unemployment quite high by the standards
of the other two recoveries. Should this kind of
truncated recovery occur, the "normal" unem-
ployment/unused capacity relationshipprobably
would not be restored until well into the follow-
ing recovery, that is, some time after 1980.
Neither scenario, in any event, suggests the
possibility ofa return to historically low levels of
unemployment for some time.
FOOTNOTES
1. To measure unused capacity, we subtract the pUblished
capacity-utilization rate from 100. Thus, arise in unused capac-
ity accompanies a rise in unemployment.
2. This aspect of the labor data is examined by Rose McElhat-
tan elsewhere in this Review.
3. Strikes generally appear as one-quarter "blips" in both
unemployment and capacity, and so barely affect the moving
averages in Chart 1. The largest single post-Korea strike-the
1959 steel strike-affects our conclusion only moderately.
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4. Okun's Law, the econometric rule-of-thumb relating
changes in unemployment to growth in income, exactly pre-
dicts the 1.4-percentage point decline which has actually
occurred. This indicatesthatchanges in unemploymentarestill
closely tied to changes in real income.
5. The war in Vietnam tended to limit the number of new
entrants into the labor force in the 1965 period. However, the
relativelysmall size ofthatwar (as compared with Korea) makes
it hard to adjust for that data.